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Empowering Catering Sales Managers with Pricing Authority
Abstract

In the hotel business, catering sales managers often encounter potential clients who expect to negotiate for
items such as room rental fees, audiovisual charges, and bartending fees. This article addresses both the
advantages and disadvantages of empowering sales managers with the authority to reduce or waive these
charges. Thus, hoteliers are advised to extend a structured yield management mindset into the hotel’s
function-space area.
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Empowering Catering Sales Managers
with Pricing Authority
By Vincent P. Magnini and John N. Gaskins
In the hotel business, catenig saler manngers $ e n mrounterpotsntiul cfientr who a p e d to ncgotiutcfbr
items such as mom rental/IesI audiorirual charges, and bartendingjies. This article addresses botb the aduantuge~
and di~aduaatages$eqofyering sales managers with the aufhotig to reduce or waim these c h u ~ .Thus,
botclm am adwised w extend a stmrfu~dyteldmanagement mindref into the hotel'sfunction-spaa area.

Introduction
There exists at least one truism in the hotel industry: the food and beverage business is
competitive. Often when a full-service hotel's restaurant outlets are struggling to break-even,
(Brennan, 2000, W'bitford, 1999) it is the catcring revenucs from meeting areas that are relied
upon to drive the food and beverage department's bottom line. Nevertheless, the catering sales
managers who book this space, continuously encounter customers who expect to negotiate. In
the circumstance of business meetings, for example, clients often ask if room rental charges can
be reduced, if set-up fees can be waived, or if the use AV equipment can be made
complimentary. In the case of an emotionally-laden social event, such as a wedding, customers
regularly ask if the bartending fee can be forgone, the champagne toast included, or the cake
cutting fee waived.
The question that this article addresses is: Should individual catering sales managers be
empowered to make these pricing decisions; or should they be required to obtain
from the Director of Sales and/or the Director of Food and Beveras before reducing or
exonerating a particular fee? This topic has never been explicitly examined in the hospitality
literature, but it is a question which begs to be addressed. The issue is managerially relevant
because not empowering the catering sales manager with pricing authority may add unnecessary
red-tape to the negotiating process; conversely, granting pricing permission may result in suboptimal revenue generation. Therefore, the purpose of this anicle is to provide hoteliers with
essential guidance in this empowerment decision. To accomplish this purpose, this article Gst
outlines arguments in favor of granting sales managers pricing authority. Second, arguments
against delegating pricing authoriq are detailed. Lastly, in the final sections, hoteliers are
encouraged to develop a yield management strategy for hotel meeting and catering space.
Arguments in Favor of the Delegation of Pricing Authority
First, selected research supports delegating pricing authority becausc of the salesperson's
proximity to the customer. pal, 1986; Joseph, 2001; Weinberg, 1975) After all, it is the
salesperson that has the most direct contact with the potential cateringclient. This line of
reasoning sustains the notion that the catering sales manager is in the best position to assess the
customer's desired benefits and perceived value. In fact, most human communication is nonverbal, (Preston, 2005) and it is the catering sales manager who has the face-to-face interaction
with the potential client. For example, the catering sales manager can assess the customer's
willingness to buy, in part, through the customer's tone of voice, speed, volume, and inflection.
Moreover, the catering sales manager can read the body language in the negotiation process.
Tabk 1 outlines receptive and non-receptive body language in the part of the potential buyer in
the negotiating process. As a result of both verbal and non-verbal comrnu~cation,the catering
salesperson can deduce the customer's level of need and willingness to pay. Hence, in a nutshell,
because the sales manager has the most contact uith the client then some would argue that slhe
should be authorized to adjust prices.
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Table 1: Negotiating Body Language*
'Yes" motion with the head
C o c k the head to one side
Touching the forehead
Touching the chin
Uncrossing the legs
Unbuttoning the suit coat
Leaning forward
Moving to the edge of the chair
Clutchmg the back of the neck
Nervousfidgrting
Placing a hand over one's mouth
Locking ankles
Gripping one's wrist
Crossing arms on chest
Making a fist
Point feet toward the door
* Note: The information in this able is drawn from the following sources: N.M.Henley, Body
Po&is (New York Simon and Schuster, Inc, 1977): G.I. Nierenherg, Fundam6nldr ofNgodan'ng
(NewYork: Hawthorne Books, Inc, 1973); and M.F. Vargas, Londerthan W o d (Iowa: The Iowa
State University Press, 1986).
Second, some experts contend that the salesperson should be granted pricing authority
of the firm and the sakspcrson.
the
when compensation can be structured that +s
(Farley, 1964; Parley and Weinberg, 1975; Lal, 1986;Joseph, 2001; Weinberg, 1975) In other
words, the salesperson should be authorized to set prices as long as compensation is based upon
the gross margin of the hotel's food and beverage department. According to this reasoning, if
the catering sales salesperson's commission is based upon gross margin, then s/he would only
lower the price when necessary to win thr sale. Often hotels will achieve this objective by
aligmng the managerial bonus criteria of the catering sales managers and the food and beverage
managers.
m d , some argue that delegating pricing authority reduces bureaucracy and expedites
the transaction process because the salesperson can decide immediately whether to accept an
offer. (Dolan and S i o n , 1996) After all, what are the odds that the hotel's Director of Sales or
Director of Food and Beverage will be available at the given moment to make a judgment
regarding a buyer's offer? Therefore, the enhanced efficiency and transaction speed that can be
obtained through pricing empowerment can potentially have two posiave effects: 1) the catering
salesperson can meet with more clients, and hopefully dose more deals; and 2) the speed in
dosing deals should minimize the time in which customers c a n change their minds or search for
other meeting or catering venues.
Fourth, empowering sales staff with the authority to adjust prices may enhance their job
satisfaction. That is, selected shldies indicate that employee empowerment is positively
correlated with job satisfaction. ( G i 2001; Nelson, 2003) Likewise, the job satisfaction of the
Director of Sales and/or the Director of Food and Rwerage may be bolstered through
delegating price authority as well. Specifically stated, it is unlikely that either individual would
take pleasure in micro-managing the negotiations berween each salesperson and client The
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Director of Sales and the Director of Food and Beverage are usually considered
members of the hotel's executive committee and their time is typically reserved for higher-order
tasks, such as budgeting and forecasting.
Arguments Against the Delegation of Pricing Authority
Yet, it is important to note that the previous points in favor of price empowerment are
arguable and possess limitations. First, it is not always possible to design a compensation plan
that justifies price delegation.
(Stephenson, Cron and Fraizer, 1979) This is because salesperson
motivation encompasses a complex web of financial and non-monetary factors that vary among
individuals. (Brooks, 1989) W e n catering sales managers are motivated by forces like personal
acceptance of the customer or time-off to spend with the family, price delegation can backfue.
For example, consider a case in which the catering sales manager wanted to agree upon a
contract with a client so that s/he could leave for a weekend vacation. Perhaps the sales
manager would be apt to close the deal premahlrely in order to commence hidher vacation.
The second contention against empowering sales personnel with pricing authority is that
the capabihty may make the salesperson too compliant when negotiation scenarios surface.
aoseph, 2001; Dolan and Simon, 1996) In other words, the salesperson may feel compelled,
either consciously or subconsciously, to reduce price as a safety measure to ensure that the sale is
dosed. This can result in "sub-optimal tradeoffs between price and effort". aoseph, 2001)
Stated differently, maybe the client would have been wiling to pay the full room rental charge or
a cake cutting fee? In the hotel business, discounts often give customers a reduced price for
services that they were going to purchase anyway. (Quain, 2003) Furthermore, if the client
knows that the salesperson has pricing authority, the client may demand a price reduction. In
sum, enuusdng a catering sales manager in pricing decisions assumes that s/he is a better
negotiator than the potential buyer.
Third, delegating pricing authority to sales personnel may result in inconsistent behavior
across customers or segments. (Dolan and Simon, 1996) For example, a sizable portion of social
catering is won through word-of-mouth. Perhaps, therefore, if the catering sales manager were
to waive a fee for one client, another client may demand the same consideration. Also, if clients
were to discover price discrepancies after the fact, this may result in feelings of dissatisfaction or
resentment. Consumers are generally accepting of paying disparate pricing for sleeping rooms
because they have come to realize that yield management systems operate upon the premise of
supply and demand. (Kimes, 2002b) Conversely, entrusting individual catering sales managers
with ad-hoc pricing authority is quite different than employing htghly evolved yield management
systems.
The value that a client sees in a catering or meeting operation is based largely o n the
perceptions of the client. Often in the hospitality industry, consumers use price as an indicator
of quality. (Lewis and Shoemaker, 1997) Therefore, the value of a hospitality offering is based
largely upon the buyer's mental reference price. The term rjienceprice is the standard price
against which consumers evaluate the actual prices of the services they are considering.
Specifically, the practice of individual sales reps adjusting prices could be demmental to the f m
because it could result in lower reference prices and ultimately reduce the perceived value of
catering experience.
Since an integral part of any business negodation is to create perceived value in the eyes
of the potential buyer, (McRae, 1998) the catering sales manager should understand how to do
so. One strategy involves checking with an authority figure before granting a price discount. In
other words, perhaps a price discount might be perceived as "special" if the client knows that it
required the approval of the salesperson's boss. Again, successful negotiating revolves around
creating perceived value and, consequently, some buyers may only feel as if they are gemng a
good deal if the discount has been granted by a higher-up. Hence, this line of reasoning is an
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decisions.

empowering the catering sales rep with the uldmate authority in pricing

Also, delegating pricing authority to the sales force may be unwise because the setting of
an opcimal price requires analysis of factors unfamiliar w the sales force. p o l a n and Simon,
1996) That is, meeting and catering services have unique cost structures that involve numerous
variables [for example: cost of food, production labor, and set-up costs]. It is not realistic to
expect the sales force to be completely familiar with such complex and variable cost structures.
For example, it is not possible for the catering sales manager to stay up-to-date with the
fluctuating beef, seafood, or produce prices that the food and beverage depamnent is receiving
from its vendors. Nevertheless, without this knowledge, it can be argucd that when a
salesperson adjusts a price, it is being done without vital information.

A €ma1 argument against delegating pricing authority is that price empowerment could
impact the prospecting activities of the salesperson. Along these lines, a recent study found that
increasing pricing authority often decreases a sale rep's prospecting effom. This diminished
prospecting is a result of the fact that full pricing authority leads to a disproportionate focus on
hgh-vahudon customers. (Joseph,2001) This lopsided prospecting pattern can be harmful to
food and beverage dcpawent because, although high profit customers are advantageous, the
hotel's meeting space is perishable and needs to be occupied on slow days by less-profitable
groups (e.g. religious organizations on Sundays).
The Pricing Authority Continuum
When examining the issue of sales force price empowerment, most early srudies took
positions either in favor of, (Fadey, 1964; Farley and Weinberg, 1975; Weinberg, 1975) or
against, (Stephenson and Frazier, 1979) the delegation of pricing authority. However, more
recent studtes support flexible stances based upon the particular situation. aoseph. 2001) Stated
differently, delegating pricing authority to the catering sales staff is not a binary decision that
involves two opposing choices, but rather it is a choice that involves a continuum of alternatives.
The continuum ranges from no pricing authority to complete pricing authority, with a spectnm
of limited authority scenarios lying in between.

Figure 1: Pricing Delegation Continuum
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As presented in Figure 1, one limited authority scenario is to base the level of delegation
upon the characteristics of the customer or segment. For example, perhaps a catering sales rep
should be granted full pricing authonty when negotiating with customers about whom s/be has
superior information over that of the Director of Sales and Marketing. (Lal, 1986) Conversely,
maybe this authority could be reduced when negotiating with a client about whom the catering
sales manager and the Director of Marketing have identical information. Also depicted in F i i e
1, other limited authority options may include allowing the sales manager to only reduce certain
offerings; or to establish a price floor to which a sales manager must adhere. While these
examples of limited pricing authority are more advantageous than unchecked empowermenf or
no authority, the next section of this amcle states that pricing options made available to the sales
managers should be founded upon the principles of supply and demand.
Developing a Meeting and Catering Space Yield Management Strategy
The solution to the debate surrounding whether or not to allow catering sales managers
to have pricing authority lies in extending yield management practices to catering and meeting
space. Yield management pricing is defined as the charging of different prices to maximize
revenue for a set capacity at any given time. (Kerin, Hartley, Berkowitz and Rubelius, 2006) In
other words, yield management provides a mechanism for securing higher revenues from a Gxed
capacity. (Berman, 2005) Yield management pricing 1s standard practice for lodging rooms and
hotel pauons have generally grown accustomed to and accepting of its use. (Kunes, 2002a) In
fact yield management systems are now ubiquitous on the "rooms side" and have been refined
continuously throughout the past decade. Such systems should now be udlized to guide catering
pricing decisions. That is, hotel properties should employ systems that allow individual catering
and sales managers to adjust prices and fees based upon up-to-date supply and demand
information.
Yield management practices should be applied to function-space for myriad reasons.
First, yield management practices utilize differential pricing to bolster demand during off-penk
periods. (Kimes, 2000) Second, yield management policies maintain appropriate prices during
busy periods. (Kunes, 2002a) Third, not using yield management and instead using discounting
practices that are unstructured and informal encourage haggling. (Hanks, Cross and Noland,
2002) Fourth, allowing only certain catering sales managers to have price empowerment due to
qTe or negotiating skills) may spur
individual-levelcharacretistics (e.g. their
dissension and de-motivation among the sales staff. Lastly, identifiable and explainable pricing.
practicer (based on supply and demand) are percrived as fairer than unstructured rate policies.
( b e s and W i z , 2002b) Figure 2, depicts various demand scenarios relative to meeting space
capacity, and will be used in this section to demonstrate how yicld management can be applied to
catering space.'

ZONE h Excess Capacity
In the circumstance of excess capacity (the dip near the bottom center in Figure 2),
catering sales managers should be instructed to be more libcral in allowing discounts in order to
fd empty space. This process can only he achieved if the sales manager is well informed as to
when to expect excess capacity. For example, a catering sales manager could be permitted to
discount prices on Mondays because sales histoly might indicate that few meetings are held on
Mondays. Therefore, if a negotiating mood strikes a client, the sales manager could tell the client
that in order to realize a monetary savings the client's corporate meeting should be shifted from
aTuesday to a Monday. Also, since catering sales revenues are typically cyclical with the busiest
periods being the fall, spdng, and December similar savings can be realized by clients if meetings
are shifted from busy to slow months. Hence, rather than the sales manager having the
I

Please note that the specificpricing options listed in this section are intended to be suggestive rather than
exhaustive. Funher, not all are applicable to ewry type of hotel properry. It would be prudent for sacs
managers to tailor specific strategies for their given properties.
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makeshift authority to discount a meedng contract, instead the sales managcr could be versed in
the options that could result in a reduced catering check when in excess capacity anticipated
(ZONE 1).

1

Figure 2: Variation in Demand Relative to Capacity*

W m u m csany

IdameM and SW
are vsI
Wanold)

* This figure has been adapted directly from !he following source: C. Lovelock,
Getting the Most Out of Your Productive Capacity," in Product Plus (Boston:
McGraw Hill, 1994, p.241).
Also, when excess capacity is expected (ZONE I), and price discounting permitted,
sales managers can utilize this pricing authority to amend their prospecting strategies. For
instance, perhaps a salesperson is aware of certain price sensitive market segments that can now
be approached. Moreover, excess function-space creates an opporhuuty for "second-chance
s e h g " which entails cxtracdng additional profits from booked business. (Quain, LeBruto and
French 1994) For example, there could be a business traveler sta).ing in the hotel who would be
willing to rent a break-out mom in which to conduct interviews, deliver a sales presentation, or
to negotiate o n a neutral turf.

ZONE 2: Ideal Uae
Like the yield management practices for lodging rooms, during ideal use (the narrow
band near the center of Figure 2) price discounts are uncommon. Nevertheless, if a potential
customrr insists upon negotiating the catering sales manager should have several options from
which to select. One suggestion may be to instruct the client that if her group could pick-up a
certain number of sleeping rooms then the catering space can be discounted. Another option
would be for the client to give the chef the ability to pick between two or threc menu itrms and
as the event approaches. Consequently, the chef can opt for the best deals in terms of food cost
as the market conditions become salient. This same conccpt could also apply to the selecuon of
wine or beer. Another viable option when demand is not below capacity (ZONE 2), would be
to teU the buyer that a price discount could be panted on the current meeting if s/he agrees to
booking a second future meeting in a low demand timeframe. The basic premise of these
options in ZONE 2 is to empower the sales manager with the capability to negotiate, but also to
maintain the integrity of the supply versus demand situation.

ZONE 3: Demand Exceeds Optimwn Capacity
As seen in Figure 2, when demand excccds optimum capacity seMce quality is likely to
dedine. Therefore, in this high demand scenario (ZONE 3), catering sales managers should
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retain the authority to reduce fees, but reductions should be tailored to remove over-strain on
food and beverage staff. For instance, if a client demands a discount, the sales manager can
instruct thc individual that a discount can be granted if she selects the same catering menu as
another meeting group in the facility on the same day. This tactic would relreve stress not only
on the kitchen staff, but also the purchasing depamnent. In a similar vein, if a client insists upon
a discount in a busy time period. the sales manager could permit a discount if thc client selects
the same meeting room set-up (i.e. table and chair configuration) as the previous room user.
Again, negotiating guidelines such as these would afford thr sales manager the a b i t y to
negotiate, but discounting options are based upon a yield management (is. supply and demand)
rnentdity.

ZONE 4: Excess Demand
Lasdy, the top zone in Figure 2 (ZONE 4j represents the situation in which there is
excess demand and business is lost. In this situation of excess demand, the pricing options
detailed in ZONE 3 can be made available, but only to the hotel's premier customers.
Identifying the premier customers involves computing a customer's lifetime value (CLV). CLV
p a g e r and Nasir, 1998) is an esdmate of (1) how much revenue the s e ~ c provider
e
expects to
gain from the relauonship with a consumer and (2) the anticipated cost of maintaining the
relationship. Inputs into a CLV equation can include such variables as: quantity of the
customer's past purchases; probability of additional purchases over time; and the estimated cost
to the fm of serving the customer. Whde CLV calculatiorls cannot reflect factors (for
example: word-of-mouth behavior is difficult to quantify), they can provide managerial guidance
with pricing decisions in ZONE 4.

Managerial Implications
Since meeting space inventory is, like hotel rooms, a perishable cornmodit)., the need to
adjust prices is inescapable. IIowevrr, this article tells hotehers that they should not permit sales
managers to adjust prices on an ad-hoc basis. Instead, hoteliers should apply yield management
practices to catering and meeting pricing. That is, granting individual sales managers with
impromphl discretion oT7erpricing decisions has many disadvantages including unuzantcd and
unexplainable price discrepancies between customer groups. Conversely, not empowering
catering sales managers with pricing authority has a number of drawbacks such as slowing the
aansaction process. To this end, what is needed is a structured framework (based upon supply
and demand information) that can guide catcring sales managers in making pricing decisions.
Yield management computer software systems for catering spacc d o exist. For example,
some software systems monitor "contribution per avdahle space" for a given time (ConPAST).
(Kunes, 2001) In a nutshell, such systems managc supply relative to demand. It is important to
note, however, that this amcle is not suggesting that hotel properties must purchase and install
new computer systems for carcring man&gtrs. While these systems, (if used properly and to their
full potential) can be quite effective, purchasing and training costs are sometimes prohibitive.
As a feasible alternative to installing new computer systems, yield management
g
frameworks can be communicated by making nor.adons in esisdng meeting p h ~ i n software.
For example, in existing meeting planning software, scenarios can be labeled as ZONE 1-4 and
individual sales managers can be versed in the pricing options that they have in these zones. In
addition, when sales managers attend their regular sales meetings, supply and dcmand
information can be communjcated in order for them to ascertain their pricing options. When
emplojing these procedures, it is vital to note that capacity information must be updated
regularly and that new information must be systematically communicated across the sales staff.
For instance, a particular date in Jane? may no longer fall into ZONE 1 if business has been
booked for a portion of the hotel's meeting capacity. Conversely, a prime catering date in April
may not necessarily be cntegorizcd in ZONE 4 if the date approaches with n o apparent booking
interest.
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The logic contained in this article must htempered with a limitation. It is difkult to
measure the monetary benefns of yieu management through the use of empirical data. .%ice the
shift from standard to yield management pricing is typically not a single transition, before-andafter profit and revenue comparisons are usually not available. In addition, exmnal factors, such
as the economy, changes in schedule, and competition can also make it arduous to make
compvisons based on ntc efficiency or capacity udlization. (See Berman, 2005)
T o reiterate, the quescion that this attide addresses is: Should individual catering and
sales managers be empowered to make these pricing decisions; or should they be required to
obtain permission from the Director of Sales and/or the D k c m r of Food and Bevcragc bcforc
reducing or exonerating a particular fee? Upon detailing both sides to the empowerment issue,
this article advances the contention that sales managers should be permitted to adjust priccs, but
only from within an orchestrated framework based on supply and demand ( A K A yield
management). To this end, hotel properties can either instdl catering ~ieldmanagement
software systems or can urilize the ZONE 1-4 framework presented in F i r e 2.
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